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The paper presents a model ofbanks as clearinghouses ofprivate debt where money is used
as the means of payment. The model is then used to analyze elements of the real bills
controversy. Implications of the model include: i) the private provision ofbanknotes or a
discount window may be needed to avoid the insufficient debt clearing that results from an
inflexible currency stock; ii) an uncontrol1ed total money stock may result in a multiplicity
of equilibria including an inflationary banknote over-issue; and iii) the over-issue of
banknotes is not a problem when banknotes are backed by productive assets.
This paper originated from extensive discussions with Guido Tabellini. It has benefited
from the suggestions ofCostas Azariadis, Steve Williamson and seminar participants at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the "Lone Star" conference. The views expressed are
not necessarily those ofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas or the Federal Reserve System.2
In recent years the profession has begun to explicitly model many of the functions
of financial intermediaries, especially of banks. The roles of banks as monitors of
investment and as providers of liquidity, for example, have been shown to be optimal
responses to explicit environments of uncertainty and asymmetric information.l These
models offer sensible explanations ofthe structure ofbank assets and liabilities, the form of
debt offered to and by banks.
In a similar fashion we wish to model in the role of banks in the clearing ofprivate
debt, debt created between two nonbank agents. One manifestation of this role, check
clearing, isan obvious everyday function ofbanks. Another, the discounting of "real bills of
eXchange" for an elastic provision ofcurrency has been the sUbject ofheated controversy.
The debate between the real bills doctrine and the quantity theory of money has
raged for more than a century. Over mostofthe course ofthe real bills debate, neither side
offered a formal, fully explicit general equilibrium model whose assumptions or
implications could be examined and challenged. A task of modem monetary theorists is
therefore to build formal models that might sort out these conflicting claims.
A modem effort at an explicit modelling of the real bills question comes from
Sargent and Wallace (1982). Their model resurrects the real bills doctrine by exposing a
welfare costofthe quantity theory's separation ofmoney from credit -- funds from money
holders can not be used to satisfy the demand for credit, which generates differences in the
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution faced by the holders of debt and money. This
effort, while highly influential, has failed to convert many quantity theorists. Laidler (1984),
for example, argues that the model of Sargent and Wallace misses key features in the
1A recent survey ofthis literature may befound in Bhattacharyaand Thakor (1991).3
debate, in particular, the potential for the over-issue ofbanknotes in a monetary regime that
follows the prescriptions ofthe real bills doctrine.2
This paper's model of the bank as a clearinghousejoins the renewal of this debate
andfinds reasonable grounds for elementsof each view: the model displays both a useful
role for the discounting ofprivatedebtas advocated by real bills adherents anda dangerof
an inflationary over-issue of private banknotes as quantity theorists have warned.3 Naive
applications ofquantity theory restrictions fail to pennit the useful discounting, which the
real bills regime would pennit. On the otherhand naive applications ofthe real bills regime
pennit banknoteover-issue, which quantity theory restrictions would prevent. In the model
economyofthis paper, a sophisticated applicationofthe real bills doctrine perfonns the best
in the presence of a productive outside asset; a sophisticated application of the quantity
theory perfonns the bestits absence.
Toevaluate the conflicting policy advice ofthe the real bills doctrine and the quantity
theory, it is necessary to model a bank's role as a clearinghouse of private debts. Such a
model mustfeature demands for both currency and private nonbank debt. There must also
be an impediment to the bilateral settling of debt. Our model displays these features in a
model ofspatially separated agents who trade using credit andcurrency. Debt is redeemed
as each agent travels through a common area inwhich clearinghouses emerge. Moreover, in
equilibrium agents choose to use currency as a medium ofexchange (to make purchases at
destinations away from an agent's place of origin) and as a means of payment (to settle
debts).
2Smith (1988) and Mourmouras and Russell (1992) havejoined this debate by comparing the two regimes
in the face of sunspot equilibria. Sunspots play no role in the analysis I present here - we will see that an
over-issueofbanknotes may be found even instationary equilibria.
3 Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1992) examine an elastic supply of central bank or private banknotes in
responseto a random demand for currency. butdonot examine thepossibility ofbanknoteover-issue.4
In section I, the basic model of debt-clearing is constructed and analyzed. In this
basic version fiat money is the only outside asset, an assumption critical to the implications
of the model. Section II compares the equilibria of the basic model under versions of real
bills and quantity theory regimes. The narrowest interpretation ofthe quantity theory regime
is shown to provide insufficient flexibility in the stock ofcurrency - a limitation that may be
overcome through temporary issues of private banknotes or the operation of a discount
window by the central bank. On the other hand it is shown that the discounting ofreal bills,
if the total money stockis uncontrolled, may lead to a multiplicity of equilibria including
inflationary equilibria that result from the over-issue of private banknotes. Section III
examines the implications of banknote overissue when banks are competitive. In section IV
a second outside asset, productive capital, is introduced. Competitive banks that intermediate
capital are shown to be free banknote over-issue. A briefconclusion is presented in section
V.
I. A Model of Banks as Clearinghouses
Thenwdel
A large, even numberI of islands are arranged in a circle around a central island.
The islands are numbered consecutively around the circle in a clockwise direction by the
index i, i=1, 2,3, ..., 1. On each islandon the circle, N agents are born in each period t~ l.
Each agent is endowed at birth withy units ofa non-storable good specific to its island (and
with nothing when old). In the first period each island also has N agents (to be called the
initial old) who live only in the first period.
Agents born on odd-numbered islands wish to consume the goods of both odd- and
even-numbered islands when young and nothing when old (let us call such agents "debtors"
for reasons that will soon be apparent). The utility of a debtor is given by the function
v(c/. d/). Agents born on even-numbered islands (let us call such agents "creditors") wish to
consume the good ofeven-numbered islands when young and of even-numbered islandsoldarrive
at final destination
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when old. No otherconsumption isdesired. The utility ofa creditor is given by the function
U(ClI, C2t+l). Both utility functions are additively separable, increasing and concave ineach
argument, continuous, and continuously differentiable with indifference curves that do not
cross the axes.
Each odd-numbered island is paired when young with an even-numbered island
with which it may trade. When old, agents from each island travel to the central island
Agents from even-numbered islands (creditors) then continue on to an odd-numbered island
where they may trade with young debtors. When old, agents do not visit the island with
which it traded when young. The old agents arrive at theirfinal destination afterall travel by
the young has beencompleted.
The seqm!nce oftroveI within a period
I'-----;~--------__;__;c_I,-----------,
young born young visit
and endowed neighboring islands
oldvisit central island
Figure 1
On the central island live a large number of infinitely lived agents. They wish to
consume the goodofodd-numbered islands but have no endowmentof goods themselves.
00
Their utility is given by 2: ptet where etrepresents their consumption at t and f3 is a
t=0
constant between zero and 1. They are endowedonly with costless technologies ofrecord-
keeping and contractenforcement
All agents are able to issue unfalsifiable 10Us that identify the issuer. A legal
authority exists on each island that canenforceagreements between parties currently on the6
same island. This authority can also bear honest, written, transportable witness about any
activity that takes place on an island.
The initial old creditors own a fixed stock offiat money, totaling M dollars on each
even-numbered island. Fiat money is non-counterfeitable, unbacked, intrinsically useless,
and costlessly exchanged.4
EquiUbriumcondltions
To consume when old, creditors must bring something of value to the young
debtors. Fiat money will be accepted by young ofeach odd-numbered island ifit helps them
to acquire the goods they desire. If it is accepted in equilibrium, fiat money serves as a
"medium ofexchange."
The young debtors wish to consume goods from even-numbered islands but own no
goods valued by the young creditors thatcan be offered inimmediate direct exchange. Nor
do the debtors have any money at the time ofthis visit. They will later be able to sell some
of their endowment for the money of the old but this money is not yet in the hands of a
young debtor when it visits its neighbor. The only thing a debtor can offer creditors is a
promise to pay a sum ofmoney in the next period on the central island. The young debtor
will acquire this money by selling some ofits endowment to old creditors orothers bringing
money to the island.
Inthis monetary equilibrium both fiat money and debt are valued. Money serves not
only as a medium ofexchange but also as a means of payment, the means by which debts
are cleared. Money is essential in this model for the clearing ofdebts and the existence ofa
4A fixed stockofgold or some other easily tradeablecommodity money would servejust as well for most
of the analysis. but the assumption of an intrinsically useless money allows us to abstract from
consideration ofthe possibleconsumptionofthe commodity money.7
credit market - without valued money, equilibrium debt equals zero. As we will see, in
addition to fiat money there may another form ofmoney.
The seqlU!nceoftrades within a period
old visit central island
where IOUs are cleared
using money
I I I
y·-::o:--u:--n .... g--;bo:-:-:rn--------y-o-u-n-g--;d:-e:-btCo··-rs-p-u-r-c:-hase--g-ood--;-s----y-o-u-n-g---;-de'btors sell
and endowed using IOUs goods for money
old creditors trade
money for the goods
ofyoung debtors
Figure 2
The budget constraints ofa creditor born at t may be written in nominal terms as
fol1ows:





(1.3) y = Cil + C21+I E!.±.l
PI PI
where Pt denotes the price of goods ofaneven-numbered island at t in terms of the goods
of odd-numbered islands, PIdenotes the dollar price ofa good on an odd-numbered island
at t, and i/ denotes the nominal value at t of the creditor's loans to debtors. Because fiat
money is the only outside asset, the net nominal interest rate will equal zero in this
(1.4)
economy. The budget constraint (1.2) has already taken this into account.
Letting Ui denote the derivative ofu(.,.) with respect to the ilh argument, the resulting
first ordercondition for utility maximization can be written as
Ul = Pt.l!L
U2 PI+18
The budget constraints of a debtor born at t may be written in nominal terms as
follows:
Y Pt = CtPt + mt
mt = ht




wheremtdenotes the debtor's nominal demand for currency, htdenotes the nominal value at
t ofhis indebtedness. Combined, these budget constraints yield
Y = Ct + PI dt (1.8)
(1.9)
The resulting first order condition for utility maximization is
Vc 1 - = - Vd Pt
Equilibrium also requires that the markets for goods, loans, and currency clear. The
conditions for the clearingofthe markets for the goods ofeven- and odd-numbered islands
are respectively
Y = Ct + Cit
y = dt + C2t + et.





The clearing of the market for currency requires thaton each island total currency demand
equal the sum of the stocks of fiat money and perfect substitutes for fiat money,
"banknotes," Bt, (ifany exist)
Nmt = M + Bt (1.13)
Ifa loan market exists and operates (It = ht>0), we can combine and simplify these
equilibrium conditions in the following way. The clearing of the currency market and (1.5)
gives us an expression forPt:
M + Bt
Pt =. N(y - cd' (1.14)9
Institutionsfor theclearingofdebt
The description ofequilibrium is not yet complete. It takes as given some not-yet-
specified arrangement for the clearing ofdebt and the issuing of banknotes. Ifdebt markets
operate, creditors will arrive atthe central island with the 10Us ofthe debtors, while debtors
arrive withcurrency to repay the 10Us. The nature ofthe transactions at the central island
depends on the timing ofthe visits to the central island. Direct repayment ofdebt, repayment
through a clearinghouse, and the issuance of clearinghouse debt can each represent the
equilibrium institutional structure through which debts can be settled. Let us now examine
some possible arrival patterns and debt clearing arrangements.
Ifall agents arrive simultaneously at the central island, debtors can repay their debts,
directly or indirectly, using their currency balances. If it is costless to seek outthe issuerof
an IOU, the settling ofdebts may be accomplished through a direct meeting ofdebtor and
creditor.
The settling of debts may also take place through a clearinghouse operated by
agents of the central island. At the clearinghouse creditors would present the 10Us they
possess in exchange for currency, debtors would present enough currency to clear their
outstanding 10Us. At the conclusion ofthe transactions, the clearinghouse would possess
neither10Us orfiat money. A clearinghouse would be superior to the direct repaymentof
10Us ifandonly if the technology of tracking down debtors exhibited increasing returns to
scale. The intermediary in this case offers a check-clearing service but does not discount
privatedebt because all debts are cleared simultaneously, before anyone leaves the central
island.
Ifagents do not visit the central island simultaneously, direct repayment of10Us is
not possible, and thus a clearinghouse plays a much more useful role. Suppose, for
example, that agents visit the central island in pairs drawn from non-adjacent islands, one
memberofthe pair from an odd-numbered island, the other from an even-numbered island.
Because the two members are drawn from each ofthe two different types ofislands, the net10
debt of the two will sum to zero but because they come from non-adjacent islands, neither
will be holding the personal debtofthe other. In this case the clearinghouse can purchase
the IOUs brought to it and accept fiat money in payment of the IOUs issued by the pair.
The clearinghouse will record these transactions and use the fiat money payment of the
debtor to pay the creditor what it is owed. At any given point in this sequence the
clearinghouse holds positive balances of IOUs payable and receivable but has no net
position in debt.
The role ofthe clearinghouse becomes evenmore important ifthe arrival ofdebtors
and creditors is not so perfectly synchronized. Suppose that there is no overlapin the visits
of debtors and creditors to the central island -- one group arrives and departs before the
arrival ofthe other. Ifthe first to arrive are debtors, they will deposit fiat money to make up
the difference between their IOUs payable and receivable. As a result, the clearinghouse will
atfirst accumulate positive balances offiat money, which it will subsequently use to payoff
the creditors upon theirarrival.
Ifcreditors arrive first, the clearing ofdebt is more complicated. Creditors wish to
depart from the central island with greater balances offiat money than they possessed upon
arrival. In the other cases we have studied, creditors were paid their due with the currency
balances brought by the debtors. In this case, however, debtors arrive too late for their
currency to be used in payments to creditors. In this way the model displays a currency
shortage to which private banks orthe central bank may wish to respond.
How creditors can be paid when they arrive first is the central topic of this paper.
The answer is important to central bank policy and the continuing debate between adherents
ofthe quantity theory ofmoney and ofthe real bills doctrine.
II. Providing Liquidity
In this section we examine several institutional monetary arrangements for the
functioning of a clearinghouse when net creditors desire payment from the clearinghouse11
before the anival ofnet debtors. We first examine the monetary arrangements that would be
advocated by naive versions of the quantity theory and real bills doctrine in order to point
outthe potential ofeach for poor policy. Roughly speaking, we will identify arrangements
permitting the free issue ofnotes with the real bills doctrine and arrangements with strict
controls onthe total stockoffiat money and its substitutes with thequantity theory. Narrow
interpretations of these theories will serve as benchmarks. This does not imply that
advocates ofone orthe other believe in these narrow interpretations. Indeed, we will see that
the most sophisticated interpretations ofboth, featuring the wisest qualificationsand caveats,
will sometimes lead to equivalentequilibria
A strictquantitytheory regime
Suppose that fiat money is restricted to be the only monetary asset - the onlyasset
that may becarried by the old from the central island to their destinations around the circle-
andthat the stockoffiat money is fixed.
Under this strict monetary regime the clearinghouse has no means of paying
creditors should they arrive before debtors. Any agent arriving at the clearinghouse as a
creditor receives nothing in exchange for the debt he would present to the clearinghouse.
Anticipating this a potential creditor will have no desire to make a loan.s In such an autarkic
equilibrium, utility is low for bothcreditorsanddebtors. Therefore, monetary arrangements
that remove this constraint will be welfare-improving.
SIn this simple version of the model creditors facing a zero rate of return don't care whetheror not they
make the loan because they get no utility from consuming their endowment. If, however, creditors derive
even the smallest amount ofutility from the consumption oftheir endowment, or ifa loanis at all costly to
arrange, lenders facing a zero rate ofreturn will strictly prefer nottolend.13
clearinghouse notes as perfect substitutes for fiat money because they know they will travel
to the central island in the next period, where they may redeem the notes for fiat money if
they choose. Figure3 presents the balance sheet of the clearinghouse after the arrival of the
creditors, andagain after the arrival ofthe debtors.
The Clearinghouse'sBahmceSheet
afterthe exchonges with the netcreditors
Assets Liabilities
IOUs issued by net debtors = IOUs issued by netcreditors
+ banknotes
The Clearinghouse'sBalanceSheet
afterthe exchanges with the netdebum
Assets Liabilities
fiat money reserves = banknotes
Figure 3
Although this regime follows the policy prescriptions ofthe real bills doctrine, many
aspectsofthe resulting equilibrium are exactly what the strictest versionofquantity theory
would predict. In particular, consider the link between the total money stock and the price
level. The quantity theory defines the total money stock as the sum of all assets in public
hands that may be readily used to make purchases. In this economy the total money stock
per island at t is the sum of publicly held balances of fiat money (denote this Mt*) and
privately issued banknotes (Btl.
As wefound earlier, prices will be determined by the clearing ofthecurrency market





Notice that, in accordance with the quantity theory, the price level is strictly proportional to
the total money stock, including privately issued banknotes, in public hands.
Fullredemption
The effects of this regime de~nd on the frequency of the redemption of the
clearinghouse notes. Ifthe notes are always redeemed for fiat money in the period after their
issue, the clearinghouse must hold as reserves all the fiat money itreceives from debtors in
order to meet the anticipated redemptions. What does this imply for the stockofcurrency
used on each island? Publicly held currency is made up of publicly held fiat money plus
banknotes. Bydefinition, public balances of fiat money equal the total fiat money stock
minus bank reserves Rt:
Mt* = M - Rt (2.2)
Bank. reserves must be equal to the stockofbanknotes inanticipationoftheir redemption:
Therefore, publiccurrency holdings
Mt* + Bt = [M - Rt ] + Bt = M
(2.3)
(2.4)
are equal in size to the fiat money stock. Total currency in public hands has not been
changedby the issueofbanknotes because the banknotes in public hands simply replace an
equal stock offiat money now held outof circulation the the vault of the clearinghouse.
Becausethe currency stock is unaffected by the extent ofprivate banknote issue, the price







Therefore, the equilibrium under this regime is identical to that of the discount window
regime -- a full provision ofliquidity with no inflationary consequence.15
No redemption
If the banknotes of the clearinghouse have no expiration date and thus are truly
perfect substitutes for fiat money, there is no reason for agents to redeem them for fiat
money. If banknotes are never redeemed, however, the reserves of the clearinghouse are
never needed to meet the obligations of the clearinghouse. There is an opportunity for
profit-taking here - a clearinghouse could use its fiat money reserves to purchase goods for
its own consumption without ever going into default. Equivalently, if an investment
opportunity were available on the central island, a clearinghouse could spend its reserves on
some investment and take the interest as profits. In either case an issue of banknotes
represents an expansion ofthe total stock ofunbacked money: the privately created money
is added to the total stock ofcurrency in public hands without an offsetting subtraction of
fiat money from circulation. In essence, clearinghouses are given (limited) permission to
print fiat money and thus enjoy the profits from creating at no cost valued money.
Theeffects ofthis opportunity to take seigniorage profits will depend on whether or
not the banking sector is competitive. In this section ofthe paper suppose that banks are not
competitive -- there are a limited number ofchartered banks prohibited from any actions to
attract more business. In this case the bank receives the rents from seigniorage -- the bank's
charter is literally a license to print money equal to the nominal value ofthe debt brought in.
As a result, in each period there will be an expallsion of the money stock, with the easily
predictable consequence ofa rising price level.
In each period clearinghouses are allowed to issue new banknotes equal to the
nominal value ofthe debt:
BI - BI-l = N hl_] (2.6)
These banknotes will be spent by creditors purchasing goods from the young on odd-
numbered islands. Debtors repay their debts by bringing last period's currency stock to the
clearinghouses. Notice that because the only use ofcurrency in the model is to repay loans,
the stock ofcurrency at t-l is equal to the nominal value ofthe debt at t :16
M + BI_I = N hl_] (2.7)
Using this fact with (2.6) reveals the time path ofbanknotes:
BI - BI_I = M + 81-1 (2.8)
or BI = M + 2BI_I with Eo = M. (2.9)
Once the clearinghouses have received the old currency balances from debtors paying their
debts, they use the old currency balances to purchase goods from the young on odd-
numbered islands.6 In this way both the old currency balances owned by the clearinghouses
and the new banknotes compete for goods owned by young debtors, who will need currency
to payofftheir debts in the next period.
Using the time pathofbanknotes (2.9) wecan find the time path ofthe total stockof
currencyM + BI :
M + BI = M + [M + 281-1] = 2 [M + BI_l ] . (2.10)
The stock ofcurrency doubles in every period as clearinghouses print up new banknotes
equal in value to the nominal debt, which is equal to the previous period's stock of
currency.7Itfollows from the money marketclearing condition (1.14) that the price level
will also double inevery period in a stationary equilibrium.
Even though the clearinghouses are restricted to issuing notes only when presented
withevidence ofdefault-free debt, wesee the excessive banknote creationabout which the
opponents ofthe real bills doctrine have warned.8
6It can he verified helow that Pllpl+! < 1 < liP, implying that the central island owners of the
clearinghouses will wish to spend their seigniorageprofits on current consumption.
7The currency stock will grow at a lesser rate ifcurrency is held for reasons in addition to the clearing of
deht. This case is taken up at the end ofsection III
8See Laidler (1984).17
Tile multiplicityofequilibria
Between these twoextremes offull redemption and no redemption lies a continuum
of equilibria. Agents, being atomistic, are individually indifferent between banknote
redemption rates, which determine the equilibrium rateofinflation.
Suppose for example that a constantfraction yofall banknotes are redeemed. Then
the currentstockofbanknotes equals the oldunredeemed banknotes plus the new banknote
issue. Banks are permitted to issue enough notes to cover the current nominal debt, Nhl . The
stock ofbanknotes is therefore given by
= (1-y)BI-l + Nhl · (2.11)
(2.12)
In equilibrium, the current debt, Nht, is equal in size to old currency balances (M - RI_l +
BI-l) because all currency is used topayoffthe debt, implying that
BI = (1 - y)BI-l + [M - RI-l + BI-l]
= (1 - y)BI-l + [M - yBI-l + BI-l]
= 2(I-y)BI_l + M
withBo = M. Itis easily verified that for 0 < Y:s 1/2, BI grows without bound and that
M
for 1/2< y < 1, BI converges to2y _1 .
The(gross) rate ofgrowthofnominal currency balances is, bydefinition,
M - RI + BI
M - RI _! + BI-l
_ M - yBI + BI
- M - yBI-l + BI_l (2.13)
Using the expression for BI given in (2.12), this expression can be simplified (after a few
algebraic steps) to
2 (I - y)
yM
+ M + (1- Y )BI
(2.14)
As we found earlier, there is no change in the currency stock for y = 1 (full redemption)
while prices double every period for y =0 (no redemption). Itcan be verified from (2.14)18
that the gross rate ofincrease in the stock ofcurrency is 2(1- y) in the limit when the stock
of banknotes is unbounded in the limit (i.e.. for 0 < y s; 1/2) and 1 in the limit when the
stockofbanknotes converges to 2Y~ 1 (i.e.. for 1/2 < y < 1).
Ifreal currency demand is constant, the (gross) inflation rate is given by the growth
rate ofcurrency balances in (2.14).
The continual additions to the stock ofcurrency represent a seigniorage income to
the agents running the clearinghouses ofthe central island. The additions compete with the
existing currency balances with which creditors purchase goods on the odd-numbered
islands. In this way inflation represents a wealth transfer from creditors to agents on the
central island. Debtors are unaffected by inflation even though they are the ones who
actually hold the currency balances over time. The currency balances ofdebtors, however,
are exactly offset by their nominal IOUs, leaving them with zero net nominal assets. Since
creditors own the IOUs of the debtors, which are backed by the currency stock, it is they
who truly own currency balances and thus bear the cost ofseigniorage.
Preventing the overissue ofbanknotes
Toprevent the overissue of banknotes, one must ensure that they are fully backed
by reserves of fiat money by the end of every period. An obvious way to do this is to
require that clearinghouses hold reserves of fiat money equal to 100% ofthe notes issued.
In this way any increase in the issuance ofprivate currency is matched one-for-one by a
decrease in the public holding of fiat money, just as it was when notes were always
redeemed after a single period. Then the total stock ofcurrency in public hands remains the
same, leaving prices unaffected by the amount of privately issued banknotes. By itself, a
constraint on the flow ofmoney that permits banknote issue only in exchange for real debt
is insufficient to prevent banknote overissue. As quantity theorists have argued, a constraint
on the total stock ofmoney is also necessary.19
A requirement that banknotes have a limited term so that they must be redeemed for
fiat money every period would have the same effect of ensuring that clearinghouses
maintain fiat money balances backing their issue ofnotes. As we have seen, an equilibrium
with a 100% rate ofredemption forces banks to back their notes with fiat money reservesof
100%, thereby preventing banknote over-issue.
Notice, however, that the mere option ofexchanging banknotes for fiat money on
demand is not sufficient to prevent excessive note issue and rising prices, for nothing
induces or forces agents to turn intheir banimotes, which are viewedas perfect substitutes
for fiat money. The absenceof banknote redemption is not implausible. Since banimotes are
a perfect substitute for fiat currency, even a small cost or bother of redemption may
discourage all redemption. Knowing this, noncompetitive banks, whose seigniorage profits
depend on less than fUll redemption, can be expected to discourage banknote redemption.
III. Competitive Banking
Because the ownersof the clearinghouses earn seigniorage profits, every agent on
the central island will wish to run a clearinghouse and to attract as many clients as possible.
Tothis point in the analysis there has been no outlet through which the competitive desires
ofclearinghouses could be expressed. Let us rectify this omission with a look atthe effects
ofcompetition, first through lump-sum gifts, then through premiaon debt.
Competition through lump-sum gifts
Suppose there is free entry into banking, butbanks can only offer creditors lurnp-
sum gifts for clearing debt. Consider the naive real bills monetary regime in which banks
can issue banknotes equal to the debt presented to them but are under no obligation to
maintain reserves backing their banknotes. Assume that no banknotes are actually(3.1)
(3.2)
20
redeemed.9 With each creditor that brings in debt to be cleared, a bankcan issue an equal
amount of banknotes. Because currency is used only to payoff debts, the old stock of
currency also equals the nominal debt. Therefore, the banknote issue doubles the stock of
currency, earning seigniorage worth halfthe real value ofthe currency stock. The real value
of the currency stock is equal to the real value ofthe debt when currency is held only to
clear debt. A competitive bank would therefore be willing to offera gift of up to halfthe
average real value ofthe debt per creditor to a creditor that brings in his entire debt. The
zero-profit condition for a competitive equilibrium ensures that the gift will exactly equal the
value of seigniorage profits, thus returning to the creditors the wealth lost through
seigniorage.
We see from the creditors' first order maximization condition
~ - J!L
Uz - PI Pt+l
that inflation directly affects the rate ofreturn facing creditors. Forany given relative price,
p, an increase in the rate ofinflation will increase C1, which represents a decrease in the use
ofloans and currency.
The inflationary equilibrium will not bePareto optimal because inflation reduces the
real rate ofreturn below the "golden rule" or "biological" interest rate (the rate ofpopulation
growth). Itis easily verified that the first order condition for maximizing steady-state utility,
the golden rule, requires that
ul Vc
Uz = Vd
which is true for a monetary equilibrium only when there is no inflation.
9Any rate ofredemption could be analyzed here but a rate of0% is the easiest to study because the rate of
inflation is the sameinevery period.21
Competition through debt premia
If a bank makes positive seigniorage profits on each unit ofdebt broughtto it, it will
wish to attract even more ofsuch debt. Todo so an atomistic bank, ifpermitted, will pay a
premium on debt brought to be cleared. The zero-profit condition of perfect competition
requires that the bank pay a premium that returns seigniorage profits to creditors in exact
proportion to the debt (and thus the seigniorage) they bring in. Consider the case with no
banknote redemption. Let ltl+1 denote the seigniorage profits per lender and thus the
premium paid to creditors. The zero-profit condition requires that ltt+l = It. The budget
constraints of the creditors in this case are
Y PI Pt = Clt PI PI + It
It + ltt+l = 21t = C2t+1Pt+l
(3.3)
(3.4)
and the resulting first ordercondition is
~ ::: 2P1 .J!L. (3.5)
U2 PI+l
Since .J!L. = -2 1 in a stationary monetary equilibrium, the first order conditions are
PI+t
~ - PI - ~ (3.6) U2 - - Vd
which are exactly the same as the creditors' first order condition in the absence ofinflation
and the same as the golden rule (3.2). Because the quantity of debt equals creditors'
currency balances, seigniorage proportional 10 the quantity of debt is also proportional to
currency balances. Therefore, inflation has no real effect on the real value of currency
balances.
This superneutrality of money is not obtained when currency is held for reasons in
addition to the clearing of debt. Consider, for example, a version of the model in which
creditors wish to consume on even- as well as odd-numbered islands when old. As a result
ofthis new assumption, creditors will hold currency as well as debt over time and there will
be an exchange of currency for goods on all islands. Creditors selling their endowment will
prefer debt to an equal nominal value ofcurrency because of the premium on debt offered24
Assume that on each island i, i = 1,2, ..., I, there live N two-period lived agents,
"creditors," living in overlapping generations. Each creditor born on island i is endowed
when young with y units of the island's consumption good but with nothing when old. He
wishes to consume the good ofhis own island when both young and old and then travels to
the next island (i+1for i = 1, 2, ...,I-I and island 1for i = 1) whose good he also wishes to
consume. Let U( CIt, C2t+l, dt+lJ denote his utility as a function ofhis consumption ofhis
own island's good when young, his own island's good when old, and the good of the
neighboring island when old, respectively.
Onhis way to the neighboring island he travels through the central island, which is
identical to the central island ofthe preceding sections. The creditors visit the central island
in the orderoftheirindex number i (island i arrives and departs before the arrival ofislandj
ifand only ifi<J)'
On each island live infinitely lived warehouses. A warehouse has no endowmentof
goods but is endowed with a storage technology that yields x ofthatisland's goods at t+1
for each unit of the island's goods stored in period t. Assume that x > 1 (i.e., storage is
productive). Goods can not be transported across islands. Let kit denote the amount stored
percreditor born at t On island i. Warehouses are known to creditors on the same island and
to the agents on the central island but not to people on other islands.
With no endowment oftheir own, warehouses will only store goods lent to them by
creditors. How can these loans can be repaid? All that the warehouses ofisland i can offer is
a title to their nontransportable output. This output can provide for the consumption of
creditors on their own island i but not the desired consumption when they travel to island
i+1. The storage is desired by the creditors of island i-I. What must be arranged is a way
for creditors to trade for the goods they desire.
The central island, because it is a destination common to all, may be able to provide a
venue for trade. Suppose each creditor brought with him a title to some ofthe goods stored
on his island. Ifall creditors visited the central island at the same time, a spot market would25
suffice to clear all debt. The assumed sequence of visits to the central island, however,
makes things a bit moredifficult. Except for the creditors ofisland I, every creditor arrives
at the central island before any titles to the goods he desires. We must ask how then the
creditors can arrange to trade for the goods they desire.
RealBillsEquilibrium
Let us begin by examining a laissez-faire regime, like that envisioned by real bills
advocates, in which clearinghouses are permitted to issue notes backed by productive
capital.
Suppose that just before travelling to the central island, old creditors place some
goods in storage with the young oftheir home island. Let this storage be witnessed by the
island's legal authority, which issues a title to the storage. Will theold encounter anyone in
their travels who might accept the title to these stored goods in exchange for something of
value to the old?
The goods juststored on island i are valued by those who will arrive atthis island as
old creditors in the next period (those currently young on island i-I), but the oldcreditors
will never meet this group. There is, however, a means ofindirect exchange between these
two groups. Suppose that in period t the clearinghouse accepts from the old ofeach island i
a title to storage worth xik units ofisland i goods in period Hj. In return itoffers a note that
promises to pay xt: goods to the bearer in period t+j. Th~ old themselves do not wish to
consume after period t, but the young do and so will accept the banknote, the negotiable
promise ofthe clearinghouse, at its present value ofk goods. Theclearinghouse's promise to
island i is backed by the title brought from island i+2, etc. In this arrangement
clearinghouses issue notes payable to the bearer (banknotes) backed by productive capital
(storage). Alternatively, onecould say that clearinghouses discount real bills that are backed
by productive assets.
The young seek to maximize U( CIt. C21+1, dt+1) subject to the budget constraintsy :=: cll + 5t




where St represents the savings ofa young creditor (including banknotes acquired from the
previous generation) by the young att.
The first order conditionsofa stationary interiorequilibrium require that
VI VI U2 :=: x ::: U3 (4.3)
Is there a danger of the over-issue of banknotes under laissez-faire? The bank's
budgetconstraint is
(4.4)
where Btrepresents its outstanding stockofbanknotes at t, rt the gross interestit pays on
these notes, and Kt the capital stock it owns at t. Competitive pressures in intermediation
will force clearinghouses to pay the market rate ofreturn ofcapital, x, on its notes. The rate
of return x> 1 can be paid by the clearinghouses only if they maintain a stock of capital
equal in value to their liabilities, their outstanding stockofbanknotes (Xt= Bt).
A StrictQuantity Theory Equilibrium
Suppose that clearinghouses are prohibited from issuing banknotes when presented
with titles to storage. This prohibition would force creditors to hold fiat money in order to




where kt represents the storage on behalf ofa young creditor at t, mt his nominal fiat money
balances, andPt the price ofa good in units offiat money.
The first orderconditions ofa stationary interior equilibrium with a constant stock
of fiat money require that27
VI = x (4.7) D2
VI = ....l!L I (4.8) = Uj P/+l
The aggregate capital stock is lowerin the quantity theory equilibrium than under laissez-
faire because fiat money rather than capital backs the banknotes used as currency.
Creditors are thus offered a lower rate ofreturn on their currency and lower steady-state
utility. The quantity theory equilibrium is not Pareto inferior to laissez-faire because it is
preferred by the initial generation (whose balances of fiat money have no value under
laissez-faire.)
Intennedilltion through the central bank
The implications of the quantity theory regime for capital and welfare are greatly
dependent on the means through which the government introduces its currency into the
economy. Implicitly, wehave assumed that the initial stock ofcurrency has been given to the
initial old. Forthis reason the prohibition on privately issued banknotes, which increased the
demand for fiat currency, acted as a wealth transfer from later generations ofcreditors to the
initial generation.
Suppose instead that the government sells the initial stock ofcurrency in exchange
for warehouse receipts. Such an open market operation gives the government a stock of
capital equal in value to the outstanding stock of currency. This capital generates output
sufficient to finance a gross real rate ofreturn oncurrency equal to x, the same rate ofreturn
offered by unfettered private banks under laissez-faire and thus the same equilibrium levels
ofcapital and utility. In sum, the intermediation conducted by private clearinghouses under
laissez-faire is now accomplished by a central (government operated) bank.28
v. Concluding Remarks
In this model's world of separated markets, centrally accessible banks can playa
useful role in the clearing of debt. When the debt presented to banks temporarily exceeds
the available means ofpayment, banks need the ability to issue theirown means ofpayment
(banknotes) in order to payoffthis debt and function most efficiently as clearinghouses.
When an economy's means ofpayment is fiat money, permitting banks toissuetheir
own unbacked currency as substitutes for fiat money gives them a license to collect
seigniorage through an inflationary over-issue of private currency. This over-issue of
currency may be prevented by regulations that directlyorindirectly force banks to maintain
reserves offiat money equalling the outstanding stock ofbanknotes so that the total stockof
currency in public hands does not grow with the use ofbanknotes.
The over-issue ofprivate currency will not occurifbanknotes pay interest and are
backed by productive assets. In this case banks must maintain reserves ofproductive assets
in order to pay interest on its notes, preventing them from earning seigniorage through the
issue ofunbacked notes. Regulations that require the use ofunbacked fiat money instead of
backed banknotes reduce equilibrium capital. Government currency backed by capital and
paying the market rate ofinterest, however, leads to the same levels ofcapital and welfare as
unrestricted private intermediation.29
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